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Abstract 
Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as 
immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is 
disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of 
disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, 
practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation etc. However, there are 
some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. 
If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of 
immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of 
immaturityEDVHGRQ'XGOH\6KDSHUH¶VZRUNRQWKHLQWHUQDOH[WHUQDOGLVWLQFWLRQ,WKHQJRRQ
to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social 




This paper concerns the cognitive and social sciences in the broad sense of sciences 
concerned with mind, brain, and social and individual behaviour, including but not limited to 
psychology, neuroscience, sociology and anthropology. These are the sciences most often 
ODEHOOHG DV ³LPPDWXUH´ W\SLFDOO\ EHLQJ contrasted with physics as the prime example of a 
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mature science. Here I will focus in particular on psychology because it is the most discussed 
example in the literature, and cognitive neuroscience from which I will draw a useful 
illustrative example. However, the account is meant to be one of immature science in general. 
I will take the claim that the cognitive and social sciences are immature as a starting 
point and ask what sense can be made of it. It is not a claim that everyone agrees with; for 
example when cognitivism first became dominant, a literature emerged taking it as the basis 
for mature scientific investigation (e.g. Palermo, 1971), and there has since been some 
discussion of what should replace cognitivism in this role (e.g. Harré and Gillett, 1994; 
2¶1HLOO). This paper is not addressed to these literatures, but to those that do consider 
the cognitive and social sciences to be immature. 
Why do we need an account of immaturity? It seems that there is something that 
physics is doing better than psychology, and it is desirable to capture this intuition such that 
immaturity claims are more than just excuses for some perceived failings in psychology. 
Better yet, we would like to say something about immaturity that provides a recommendation 
for how psychologists and other cognitive and social scientists should proceed, and how 
philosophers of science can contribute to their work. The main aim of this paper is to develop 
a new account of what it is for a science to be immature that meets these desiderata. 
The paper will begin by outlining the received view, according to which immaturity is 
disunity. A major problem for the received view is a significant and growing pluralist 
literature in philosophy suggesting that science should be disunified. If this literature is on the 
right track, we need a new account of immaturity. I will develop such an account, using the 
work of Dudley Shapere, in particular his (1986a) SDSHU³External and Internal Factors in the 
'HYHORSPHQWRI6FLHQFH´. This account says that an immature science is one that does not yet 
have a well-developed internal/external distinction. According to this view, the idea that a 
science should be unified to be deemed mature is something that has been imposed on the 
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cognitive and social sciences from the physical sciences. The prevalence of the received view 
of immaturity thus will be explained by the new view.  
 
2. The Received View 
:KDWHYHULPPDWXULW\LVLWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWKDWLWFDQMXVWEHD matter of time, given that 
mind and behaviour have been studied since the ancient Greeks if not before. Talk about 
immaturity usually cites Thomas Kuhn, in particular the Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
([1970] 1996). According to .XKQ¶V account, immature sciences are pre-paradigmatic: 
µAcquisition of a paradigm is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific 
fieOG¶ (Kuhn, 1996, 11).1 Much of the literature follows Kuhn in using psychology as the 
main example of an immature science. 
Psychology is seen as being pre-paradigmatic in the sense that its research is still 
largely based around the accumulation of data and observations without any overarching 
program to unify and guide this research. As Kevin Rand and Stephen Ilardi say here: 
 
From its inception as a distinct discipline, psychology has been characterized by conceptual 
disarray (Henriques, 2004) and relatively slow scientific progress (Meehl, 1978). This is not to 
suggest any shortage of psychological research, as the field generates a massive empirical 
OLWHUDWXUH HDFK \HDU 5DWKHU ZH QRWH WKDW SV\FKRORJ\¶V P\ULDG DQG GLYHUVH SURJUDPV RI
research are, as a rule, neither coherently connected to one another nor meaningfully linked to 
relevant lines of investigation in related scientific disciplines (Staats, 1999). The field has 
instead witnessed the relentless accumulation of assorted facts, findings, and theories that 
typically fail to find integration across rival research enclaves and theoretical factions (Ilardi & 
Feldman, 2001a; see also Miller, 1992; Staats, 1983). In short, psychology functions as an 




As this quotation UHYHDOVLWLV³conceptual GLVDUUD\´DQGWKHIDLOXUHWRLQWHJUDWH³programs of 
UHVHDUFK«IDFWV ILQGLQJV DQG WKHRULHV´ that are at issue. Psychology lacks a unifying 
paradigm to give shape to the research it generates. 
Unification is something that the cognitive and social sciences should strive towards, 
according to this account of immaturity. Arthur Staats puts this quite explicitly:  
 
[M]y own philosophy of science states as a fundamental principle that all sciences begin in 
disunity and only advance toward unification by dint of hard and lengthy scientific 
achievement...Psychology is very much a science, but it is a science early in its career. 
Psychology is what I call a modern disunified science, with a plethora of diverse and unrelated 
scientific products but with little investment in unifying those products. The resulting 
disorganization of knowledge leads people such as Toulmin (1972) to consider psychology a 
³ZRXOG-EHVFLHQFH´ (Staats, 2004, 273) 
 
According to the received view then, unification is the route to maturity. 
While accepting WKDW WKLVGLVXQLW\ LVSUHVHQW ,GRQ¶t think it can be the basis for an 
adequate account of immaturity, for reasons I will explain in the next section. To describe the 
disunity without tying myself to a particular version of the received view, I will say that 
psychology and the other cognitive and social sciences have a plurality of disunified 
frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, 
methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation etc. I am thuVXVLQJ³framework´ as a 
broad and relatively neutral term, capturing many of the same elements as a Kuhnian 
paradigm (Kuhn, [1970] 1996), a research program for Lakatos (1968), a research tradition 
for Laudan (1977), or a research framework for Von Eckardt (1993), while remaining neutral 
between the details of the disagreements between them, and the implications of the rest of 
their respective analyses.2  
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The language of frameworks can be used at different levels of organization in the 
sciences. There are frameworks for subdisciplines, but also coarser-grained frameworks for 
broader disciplinary groups, and finer-grained frameworks for particular research groups. The 
disunity that is at the root of the received view of immaturity is found at various levels, 
although the claim is usually made in terms of disunity for a discipline, e.g. psychology as a 
whole. I will now illustrate the relevant kinds of disunity with an example. 
 Although the literature focusses on psychology, and my discussion here has so far 
largely followed it in this respect, the received view is intended as an account applicable to 
immature sciences in general. The example I want to make use of here is from cognitive 
neuroscience: the Cognitive Atlas Project (see Poldrack et al., 2011). Although Russell 
Poldrack and his collaborators do not talk in terms of immaturity, they begin their paper 
about the Cognitive Atlas project with a quote from Rutherford %5RJHUVVD\LQJWKDWµ:H¶UH
drowning in information and starYLQJ IRUNQRZOHGJH¶, expressing the same concern for the 
plurality of disunified frameworks as that just outlined. 
 
2.1 An Example: The Cognitive Atlas Project 
This example will illustrate the plurality of disunified frameworks, and an attempt by 
scientists to deal with the situation. The Cognitive Atlas project is an open collaborative 
project to map the current ontology of cognitive neurosciHQFH ZKHUH DQ RQWRORJ\ LV µan 
³explicit specificatiRQRIDFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ´, (Gruber, 1993) or a structured knowledge base 
meant to support the sharing of knowledge as well as automated reasoning about that 
NQRZOHGJH¶ (Poldrack et al., 2011, 2). 





A PHQWDO FRQFHSW LV D ODWHQW XQREVHUYDEOH FRQVWUXFW SRVWXODWHGE\ D SV\FKRORJLFDO WKHRU\« 
Some potential kinds of mental concepts include (but are not limited to) mental representations 
and mental processes«A mental task is a prescribed activity meant to engage or manipulate 
mental function in an effort to gain insight into the underlying mental processes. (Poldrack et 
al., 2011, 3) 
 
Various relations between these terms (e.g. is-a, part-of, measured-by) are also included. A 
page for each concept gives a definition of the concept, its relations to other concepts, tasks 
used to measure the concept, links to databases containing any associated fMRI images (e.g. 
NeuroSynth, see Yarkoni et al., 2011), a section for discussion, and a bibliography of relevant 
papers. 
Using an example allows me to now be more explicit about the kinds and sources of 
disunity involved. Firstly, the fMRI data from neuroscience often does not match the mental 
concepts that have traditionally been used in cognitive psychology. This is part of the 
problem that the project was set up to address, and can be seen as stemming from the 
differing frameworks in use in neuroscience and in cognitive psychology. The coming 
together of subdisciplines whose frameworks developed somewhat separately in order to 
form interdisciplinary hybrids like cognitive neuroscience is therefore one source of 
disunified frameworks.  
Secondly, there is disagreement over the mental concepts themselves. For example 
Poldrack et al. give three different definitions of working memory, all of which are found 
within cognitive neuroscience (Poldrack et al., 2011, 1). These definitions apply to distinct 
processes that occupy different roles in investigation, or places in the frameworks of different 
research groups within the same subdiscipline. 
Thirdly, there is a problem of equating tasks with mental constructs. Poldrack et al. 
detail several problems this causes, one of which being the assumption that each task 
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measures a specific construct. They give the example of WKH ³6WHUQEHUJ LWHP UHFRJQLWLRQ
WDVN´, which they say µLVRIWHQ UHIHUUHG WRDV WKH³6WHUQEHUJZRUNLQJ PHPRU\ WDVN´, which 
implies that it measures a specific mental construct ³ZRUNLQJPHPRU\´¶ Not only is there 
DPELJXLW\LQZKDW³workiQJPHPRU\´ means, but also 
 
any link between tasks and constructs reflects a particular theory about how the task is 
performed; thus, equating tasks with constructs makes theoretical assumptions that may not be 
shared throughout the community (and further, those community assumptions may be 
incorrect). (Poldrack et al., 2011, 2) 
 
In the terms I have been using here, the task and mental construct are part of different 
frameworks for different members or groups of members in the community. Task and 
construct are related to one another and to other aspects of theory and practice in different 
ways in these different frameworks. 
 The Cognitive Atlas project attempts to work towards a solution to these kinds of 
disunity by mapping the disagreements. Its collaborative nature is an essential part of this. 
When the project began,  
 
[a]n initial vocabulary of more than 800 terms was identified manually through analysis of a 
broad set of publications on cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience and curated by 
three of the authors (Russell A. Poldrack, Robert M. Bilder, Fred W. Sabb). (Poldrack et al., 
2011, 3)  
 
Subsequently, anyone approved by the authors as a contributor can make changes and 
additions. Discussion of these changes is encouraged first, and there is space incorporated for 
these discussions. If there is sufficient disagreement a concept will fork, i.e. be split into 
several different definitions with a disambiguation page (Poldrack et al., 2011, 7±8). In this 
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way, the project is aiming for an ontology that everyone can agree on, i.e. attempting a kind 
of unification of the diverse frameworks in play. As the authors say: 
 
Our approach to this issue is inspired by the success of social collaborative knowledge building 
projects such as Wikipedia, which allow discussion and the expression of divergent views in 
service of developing a broader consensus, and one that can be modified flexibly over time as 
new knowledge emerges (Poldrack et al., 2011, 3, my emphasis). 
 
The project also has the potential to result in unification between fMRI data and 
mental concepts, and there are also plans to extend it further by linking databases of other 
things such as psychiatric syndromes, genes and signalling pathways (Poldrack et al., 2011, 
9). The ambitious goal of such plans is unification with frameworks from even more 
subdisciplines. Nothing is presupposed in the project about how that unification may come 
about; for example it may be reductive, or non-reductive. 
On the received view discussed in this section, we can see the Cognitive Atlas project 
as an attempt to move toward unification, and therefore as part of an effort to achieve 
maturity for cognitive neuroscience. In what follows, I will suggest that this is the wrong 
view, and in fact may inhibit the process of maturation. 
 
3. Pluralism in the Cognitive and Social Sciences 
This section will make use of recent pluralist literature to suggest that disunity is no 
bad thing for the cognitive and social sciences. The material will only be suggestive, but the 
rest of the paper will illustrate the benefits of taking up this suggestion and developing a new 
account of immaturity. 
Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino and C. Kenneth Waters (2006) distinguish usefully 
between plurality and pluralism, and I will make use of their distinction here. Plurality is a 
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descriptive term, while pluralism is normative; it is a program one would advocate. The 
current situation in the cognitive and social sciences is one of plurality; in this section I am 
looking at literature that advocates pluralism. This literature suggests that the current 
situation is no bad thing and the cognitive and social sciences should, for one reason or 
another, be plural in nature.  
Pluralism is becoming an increasingly popular outlook in the philosophy of cognitive 
science (e.g. Dale, 2008), with several journal special issues being devoted to the topic (e.g. 
Staats, 1991 and comments on his article in American Psychologist [McNally, 1992, Kukla, 
1992, Schneider, 1992, Green, 1992, Kunkel, 1992]; a special issue of New Ideas in 
Psychology, volume 28, issue 2, 2010). Rick Dale talks about diversity of theories, 
µH[SODQDWRU\ VFKHPHV¶ and µtheoretical frameworks¶ (Dale, 2008, 156±157). Looking at a 
selection of authors from the New Ideas in Psychology special issue on pluralism, Jason 
Goertzen mentions conceptual frameworks (Goertzen, 2010, 202), Tsuneo Watanabe talks 
about paradigms (Watanabe, 2010, 254), and William Smythe and Stephanie McKenzie about 
diversity of methodologies and theoretical orientations (Smythe and McKenzie, 2010, 227). 
It is clear from these papers that many interconnected aspects of scientific endeavour 
are under scrutiny when we talk about pluralism. In the terms I have introduced, these are the 
HOHPHQWV RI ZKDW , KDYH FDOOHG ³IUDPHZRUNV´ VR pluralism here is about advocating 
maintaining a range of disunified frameworks. 
Although I do not have space to provide a detailed argument for pluralism about the 
cognitive and social sciences here, there are a variety of perspectives taking this line in the 
literature, and I will briefly outline some of them. According to some, pluralism is 
appropriate for science in general, and this is an increasingly popular position. It comes in 
more metaphysical (e.g. Cartwright, 1999) or more pragmatic (e.g. Chang, 2012) flavours. 
Alternatively there might be something particular about the subject matters handled by the 
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cognitive and social sciences. One possible feature that may set these sciences apart from the 
physical sciences is causal complexity; the cognitive and social sciences study so many 
causal chains with such complex interconnections (what William Wimsatt [1994] refers to as 
³causal WKLFNHWV´ WKDW WKHUH FDQ EH QR XQLILHG ³WKHRU\ RI HYHU\WKLQJ´ in their domains. 
Another alternative is that we should adopt pluralist theorizing for its beneficial implications. 
For example, there is an argument in the feminist philosophy of science that theories and 
models are partial and goal-directed according to the interests of particular groups. The 
pluralist says that many of these theories and models should be pursued, thus allowing 
traditionally marginalised voices to be heard (Longino, 1996, 275±277). 
There are also a variety of types of pluralism. For example it may turn out to be 
fruitful to work out the relationships between frameworks and have them interact with one 
another $V 'DOH VD\V µ[i]t [the pluralist approach] may also recommend integrating these 
competing theories in meta-theoretical frameworks that would sustain their co-H[LVWHQFH¶ 
(Dale, 2008, 156). Much of the literature on pluralism discusses potential ways of doing this 
(e.g. Sandra MiWFKHOO¶V ,QWHJUDWLYH3OXUDOLVP>Mitchell, 2002, 2003]; from the New Ideas in 
Psychology VSHFLDOLVVXHPHQWLRQHGDERYH*RHUW]HQ¶V'LDOHFWLFDO3OXUDOLVPDQG6P\WKHDQG
0F.HQ]LH¶V Dialogical Pluralism are attempts at a similar thing). 
We do not know what a successful pluralist picture would look like²what degree of 
integration between frameworks there should be etc. But for my purposes here it is enough to 
establish that the cognitive and social sciences currently exhibit plurality, and there are 
plausible reasons to think they ought to stay that way. 
On the received view, the observed plurality is a sign of immaturity in a science, and 
maturation consists in moving away from it and toward unification. If authors such as Dale 
are correct to advocate pluralism, either they are advocating remaining an immature science, 
or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option strips the notion of immaturity of 
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its usefulness because it leaves sciences like psychology without a clear route to improve 
their theory and practice. This is what we wanted a notion of immaturity for, so it would 
render the notion redundant. Therefore if the pluralists are right, we need a new account of 
immaturity. Providing such an account will open up a new potential route to maturity, as well 
as explaining the prevalence of the received view. 
 
4. A New Account of Immaturity 
4.1,QWURGXFLQJ6KDSHUH¶V,QWHUQDO([WHUQDO'istinction 
My account of what it is for a science to be immature stems from ideas developed by 
Shapere, particularly in his (1986a) SDSHU³External and Internal Factors in the Development 
of Science´ In this sub-section, I will outline 6KDSHUH¶V distinction. 
On 6KDSHUH¶V YLHZ WKHRULHV PHWKRGV WKH JRDOV RI D VFLHQFH ZKDW FRXQWV DV DQ
observation etc. (in other words all the aspects of what I have been calling frameworks) can 
be shaped both by considerations internal to the science, and by external considerations. 
There is no distinction between the internal and external that can be laid down from a meta-
scientific perspective, for example by philosophy. The distinction must emerge over time 
from the pUDFWLFHRIWKHVFLHQFHLWVHOIµit is a distinction which has been forged in the very 
process of investigation of nature, not laid down in some edict from heaven or philosophy 
which determines what counts as scieQWLILF DQG ZKDW GRHV QRW¶ (Shapere, 1986a, 6). It is 
therefore not the crude distinction between the scientific and the social that some other 
versions of the internal/external distinction reduced to (see Shapin [1992] for a relatively 
sympathetic discussion of various versions).  Which considerations are internal and which are 
external is subject to gradual change over time as the science develops. ,Q6KDSHUH¶VZRUGV
  
[c]larification with regard to these four aspects of inquiry²what to study, what was relevant 
to the study, the appropriate methods for that study, and the character of an explanatory 
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conclusion to the study²required learning how to learn about nature. (Shapere, 1986a, 3, 
emphasis in original) 
 
To say that consideratiRQV DUH ³LQWHUQDOL]HG´ means that they become part of the 
background that the science can rely on. 7KLVEXLOGVRQ6KDSHUH¶V(1984) work on objectivity 
and rationality of reasons in science. +HUH6KDSHUHVD\VWKDWµ«Whe problem is to show how 
the HPSOR\PHQW RI VRPH ³EDFNJURXQG EHOLHIV´ (rather than others) can be described 
convincingly as the use of background information, serving as reasons¶ (Shapere, 1984, 640). 
Beliefs which have proved themselves become internalized ± become part of the background 
information ± and this background information is the basis of what science counts as reasons 
in its deliberations (Shapere, 1984, 645).3 ([WHUQDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV GRQ¶W FRXQW DV UHDVRQV
(Shapere, 1984, 648). In fact, this is not just a question of accumulating background beliefs, 
but of rationality. A science is rational to the extent that it has internalized the considerations 
on which it relies (Shapere, 1984, 654). 
:KDW GRHV LW PHDQ IRU EHOLHIV WR ³SURYH WKHPVHOYHV´" Something will come to be 
taken for granted as background if reliance on it results in success. As Shapere puts it in his 
SDSHUµ[t]hose considerations become internal, scientific, which have been found, as a 
matter of contingent fact, to be doubt-free (successful and coherent) and relevant to the 
domain under investigation. All other considerations become external, non-VFLHQWLILF¶ 
(Shapere, 1986a, 6±7). It is through this process that the internal/external distinction emerges 
from the investigation of nature, i.e. from the practice of science. This account gives a notion 
of progress for a science, in terms of the increasing sufficiency of internal factors to guide 
science as the distinction emerges (Shapere, 1986a, 2). 
$IHZSRLQWVDERXW6KDSHUH¶VDFFRXQWDUHLPSRUWDQWE\ZD\RIFODULILFDWLRQ 
Firstly, wKDW LV PHDQW E\ ³VXFFHVV´ here is something like providing accurate 
predictions, good explanations, and useful practical applications. It is impossible to be more 
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precise than this while talking in abstract terms, because the criteria something must meet in 
order to be accurate, good, or useful must emerge from the practice of the science itself. 
When we have multiple frameworks in play, as we do in the cognitive and social 
sciences, this may sound like a species of relativism. The standards for success vary between 
frameworks, and it seems that any framework is acceptable as long as it is internally 
coherent. This is not right, however. 6KDSHUH¶V SRVLWLRQ, and my application of it to the 
cognitive and social sciences, are realist4 in the sense that there is a mind-independent world 
that constrains which theories and practices will produce successful explanations, predictions 
and applications. This is why the internal/external distinction must emerge from practice over 
time; it cannot just be laid down in advance. Although what it means to be successful is 
relative to a framework, we do not have unrestricted proliferation of theories and practices, or 
proliferation restricted only by social and political whims.5 
Secondly, it is important to emphasise that relying more on internal considerations 
and less on external ones does not mean that science should become increasingly isolated. 
Part of the motivation for tackling a particular research question rather than another will still 
often come from outside the science; there will still be wars, epidemics, technological 
fashions and so on, and they will still bring with them a demand for certain types of research 
to be prioritised over others. Part of what it is to be successful is to provide the kinds of 
predictions, explanations and practical applications that are useful at the time. There is 
nothing irrational about this context-embeddedness of science. It does not amount to 
dependence on external considerations in ShapHUH¶VVHQVHXQOHVVLWSURYLGHVcriteria which a 
science relies on as reasons that determine its theories and practices in a way that does not 
lead to success (religious considerations today are one example of this, see below). 
Thirdl\ RQH PLJKW ZRQGHU ZKDW LV GLVWLQFWLYH DERXW 6KDSHUH¶V DFFRXQW Most 
philosophers of science would recommend retaining successful theories and practices. What 
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more does Shapere give us? Most philosophers of science would recommend retaining 
successful theories because they are likely to be the theories that accurately describe the 
world. 6KDSHUH¶V account gives us more because it respects the fact that what would count as 
accurately describing the world is variable. It tells us that by looking at the history of a 
scientific framework, we can see what standards for success have been internalized, and thus 
get concrete recommendations for how the science should proceed²by aiming to meet these 
standards. This ability to precisely specify what counts as success in particular cases is of 
more use to both scientists and philosophers than a general instruction to keep successful 
theories because they are likely to be accurate. Section 5 of this paper will demonstrate one 
kind of concrete recommendation that can be made. 
A fourth important point is the contingency of what is internalized. In other words, we 
cannot predict or decide in advance of doing the scientific research which features will be 
internalizHGDVLWSURJUHVVHV7KLVLVSDUWRIDPRUHJHQHUDOWKHVLVRI6KDSHUH¶VZKLFKKHFDOOV
the Principle of Rejections of Anticipations of Nature DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK µ[t]he results of 
scientific investigation could not have been anticipated by common sense, by the suggestions 
of everyday experienFHRUE\SXUHUHDVRQ¶ (Shapere, 1987, 1). This is also an important part 
of his rejection of a meta-scientific perspective from which science can be judged. 
Finally, it is important to note that it is not the case that once internalized, methods, 
concepts, theories etc. are no longer open to question (Shapere, 1986b, 22±23). This is a 
familiar picture of what it means to accept something in science; it becomes part of the 
background that is relied upon for further research, but it is still possible to overturn even the 
most entrenched parts of the science under the right circumstances. 
I will now discuss a couple of 6KDSHUH¶Vmore concrete examples ± namely religious 
considerations and unification ± in order to flesh out this theoretical skeleton. Religious 
considerations used to be an important part of the background according to which scientific 
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theories, results etc. were judged. Newtonian theory needed God to intervene every so often 
in the motions of the planets, and this was not a dependence on something external to science 
at the time, while it would be today (Shapere, 1986a, 4±5). Shapere argues that religious 
considerations came to be external because enough other purely internal considerations were 
accumulated that they were sufficient. IQ KLV ZRUGV µsuch considerations were external to 
science precisely because the laws of science had been shown (even if as yet imperfectly and 
incompletely) to be sufficient to account for certain phenomena which had previously seemed 
WRUHTXLUHGLYLQHLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ (Shapere, 1986a, 5). Religious considerations did not establish 
the track record of success required for internalization into science, so it would now be 
considered irrational to treat them as reasons. 
The other example of 6KDSHUH¶V WKDW I will give here, unification, is of particular 
relevance for this paper. Unification between different domains was not always seen as 
important. However, the unification of electricity and magnetism and other similar cases were 
successful, so the criterion of compatibility with theories in other domains was internalized. 
Such compatibility is now a reason for adopting a particular scientific theory or practice. As 
Shapere puts it,  
 
[i]n addition to doubts based on its failures to account for its domain of responsibility, a theory 
can also be doubted on the ground that it fails to conform to a type of theory with which we 
believe it ought to conform²for example, because that type of theory has been successful in 
several other domains. (Shapere, 1986a, 6) 
 
Compatibility with other domains has become a standard for successful science, where it was 
not before. 
I will now go on use this distinction between internal and external factors to construct 




4.2. Making Use of the Distinction 
Although SKDSHUHGRHVQRWXVHWKHSKUDVH³LPPDWXUHVFLHQFH´ he does talk about the 
internal/external distinction with respect to sciences at an early point in their history. He says 
that at first, a science has internalized very little, or more precisely it does not have a firm 
idea of an internal/external distinction. This amounts to the same thing, because the 
distinction only emerges via the internalization of considerations over time. An immature 
science therefore does not have much that it can rely on as reasons, because very little so far 
has established a track record of success. The science is therefore forced to try out the 
unproven, or what Shapere in the following quotation calls ³K\SRWKHVHV´: 
 
In all these respects, what are naturally called ³hypotheses´ played a role; and there was, in 
earlier phases of science, little to go on in selecting these hypotheses. Or more exactly, the 
motivating considerations in selecting explanatory approaches might come from just about 
anywhere. Antagonism to Aristotelian forms, natures, and final causes, rather than the dictates 
of nature, entered into adoption of the mechanistic and atomistic approaches of the middle and 
late seventeenth century; Newton developed his theories of motion (and thus of space and 
time) at least partly in the light of theological considerations, objecting to Cartesian physics on 
such grounds just as his own views were deemed atheistic by Leibniz and his followers. And 
in general, the large gap between scientific ambition and scientific conclusion had to be filled, 
under such circumstances, by considerations which we today would consider non-scientific, 
external, though at the time there was little or no ground to so distinguish them. Indeed, even 
the ambitions of science at such stages were dictated, at least partly and perhaps largely, by 
considerations which would today be called external. For the distinction between the external 
and the internal to science was at best only rudimentary and in many cases did not exist at all. 




Things are different for a mature science like modern physics, and this gives a useful sense in 
which physics is more mature than psychology: It has established a firmer internal/external 
distinction, and has a body of internal considerations that it can rely on as background. 
Psychology and the other cognitive and social sciences on the other hand still have relatively 
little of such reliable background. The issue is not just a lack of internalized theory, but also 
of all the other aspects of a framework, such as clearly delineated goals, criteria for what 
counts as an observation, standards for what constitutes a good explanation etc. For many of 
these things, the cognitive and social sciences are relying on hypotheses, rather than 
considerations which have been internalized. 
 For example, with reference to the Cognitive Atlas project discussed earlier, sufficient 
criteria for a good explanation have not yet been internalized, so that it is not clear whether a 
good explanation in cognitive neuroscience should respect our folk mental categories, their 
refinements in use in cognitive psychology, the categories suggested by the fMRI data, or 
whether it must find some way to integrate these different categorizations. In general, where 
there are different frameworks in the cognitive and social sciences, it is not yet clear whether 
we should be aiming for reduction of higher level frameworks to lower level frameworks, 
establishing some non-reductionist relationship, or whether the different frameworks concern 
sufficiently different subject matter that the relationship between them does not need to be 
(and perhaps cannot be) established. 
On my account, the maturation of a science is a rational process because a more 
mature science has more that it can rationally treat as reasons, and therefore has less need to 
rely on hypotheses or external factors. ,Q6KDSHUH¶VZRUGVµ«Lt is a measure of the degree of 
sophistication of an area of science that its body of background beliefs autonomously suggest 
or imply certain hypotheses, problems, meWKRGVDQGVRIRUWK«¶ (Shapere, 1986b, 21), and 
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µ«ZLWKWKHLQFUHDVLQJVFRSHDQGSRZHURILQWHUQDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQs, scientific conclusions have 
come to be obtainable, more and more, LQGHSHQGHQWO\RIH[WHUQDORQHV¶ (Shapere, 1986b, 22). 
Does the account developed here therefore suggest that the cognitive and social 
sciences are irrational? For the purposes of this account, rationality, like maturity, is not 
something that a science either possesses or does not. Psychology is less rational than 
physics, but neither of them is rational or irrational simpliciter. This is not a derogatory 
description of psychology on this view. Inevitably a less mature science will have a less well-
developed internal/external distinction, so there is less of a body of internal considerations to 
rationally use as reasons. 
On this account, maturity does not necessarily correlate with age, because some 
sciences may continue to work with little or no internal/external distinction for a long time, 
while others may have early success, internalize criteria, and develop this distinction more 
rapidly. Here, I hope to point out one criterion that the cognitive and social sciences are 
currently relying on as though it has been internalized, when in fact it has not gone through 
this process, and is being imposed from outside the science. By moving beyond doing this, a 
new route to maturing further is opened up. This illustrates the benefit of the new view, and 
also explains why the received view of immaturity has been so prevalent. The criterion in 
question is unification. 
 
5. The New Account in Practice 
I claim that unification has not been internalized in the cognitive and social sciences, 
although it was internalized in physics and chemistry.6 Defence of the success of unification 
leans heavily on examples from the physical sciences, chiefly the unification of the theories 
of electricity and magnetism, but also of terrestrial and celestial mechanics, electricity and 
chemical events, electricity and light, and spectra, atomic structure and chemical valency 
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(Shapere, 1986a, 5; 1977, 519±521; see Staats [1991, 900] for some discussion). This track 
record of success in one group of disciplines (the physical sciences) is only a motivation to 
internalize the criterion into those disciplines. There is no reason to assume that what works 
in one area of science should work in another, so there is no reason to assume that this 
VWUDWHJ\¶VVXFFHVVLQWKHSK\VLFDOVFLHQFHV indicates that it will be successful in the cognitive 
and social sciences.  
Shapere himself seems to believe, based on his examples from physics and chemistry, 
that unification has proved itself in general so, although we could not have predicted in 
advance that this would happen, science as a whole will approach unification over time. This 
is something I am denying here; his mistake is to see unification as having been internalized 
at a higher level of organization (the level of science as whole) than it actually was. 
I am not denying that cognitive and social scientists use unification between domains 
as a criterion for shaping their theories and practices, but when they do so, it is as an external 
criterion. It is imposed from outside²from the physical sciences. It has not undergone the 
process of internalization into the relevant disciplines by proving a track record of success in 
their domains. In fact it has been in use for some considerable time in the cognitive and social 
sciences without proving such a track record, indicating that it might be time it was 
abandoned. 
 The use of unification as a criterion is the reason the received view of immaturity has 
been so prevalent; it has provided a standard that the cognitive and social sciences have been 
expected to live up to. Consideration of the pluralist literature in the philosophy of science 
discussed in section 3 suggests that these sciences might be unable to live up to this standard. 
Trying to do so thus constitutes a barrier preventing them from maturing further. Dismissing 
this standard as an external criterion removes the barrier by giving them the freedom to 
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internalize pluralism instead, if doing so results in success. Accepting the disunity that 
seemed characteristic of immature science may be the route to maturity for these disciplines. 
What about instances where use of unification has proved successful? One might 
think that, for example, unifying psychology with neuroscience is proving successful. It has 
allowed the development of various types of brain scanning techniques, and mental states can 
EH³UHDGRII´ these brain scans with some degree of accuracy, resulting in the possibility of 
various practical applications (e.g. see Shirer et al., 2012). This seems to be fruitful science in 
that it allows some degree of prediction and explanation, and has practical uses. The use of 
the computer metaphor for the mind is another example. Computationalism has been very 
fruitful, and it unifies much of the work in the cognitive sciences around a particular picture, 
for example uniting work in Artificial Intelligence with psychology and neuroscience. 
I acknowledge that there has been some degree of success using unification, but 
continued anxiety about disunity shows that many scientists do not themselves believe it is 
enough. The lack of neat unification with neuroscience is something that many psychologists 
find troubling (e.g. see Uttal, 2001). It is not only lack of unification with other subdisciplines 
that is an issue; within psychology, there is a high level of anxiety about the fragmentation of 
the discipline, and this anxiety is often coupled to immaturity talk (on the received view of 
immaturity))RU H[DPSOH WKH -RXUQDO RI&OLQLFDO3V\FKRORJ\DUWLFOH ³3V\FKRORJ\'HILQHG´
asks: 
 
What is psychology? Is it a single, coherent scientific discipline awaiting transformation from 
the current preparadigmatic state into a more mature unified one? Or, is it a heterogeneous 






Recall that it is to this more pessimistic literature that I am addressing my paper. 
Those who think we have made great strides towards unity already (for example those who 
think cognitivism is a unifying paradigm for a mature science, see above) are not those who 
accept my starting assumption that the cognitive and social sciences are immature. In fact, the 
very observations of disunity that led to the cognitive and social sciences being characterised 
as immature on the received view can now be seen to count against the internalization of 
unification. Any degree of success that has been obtained through unification does not seem 
to be enough by the scientists¶ own standards, so it certainly doeVQ¶W seem enough to 
constitute the proven track record required for internalization. Not only is the evidence from 
the physical sciences not appropriate to recommend the internalization of unification into the 
cognitive and social sciences, there is evidence from those disciplines themselves that it is 
something that should be external, because it is failing to establish a track record of success. 
We can now be clearer about the error made by believers in the received view of 
immaturity: They are privileging unification as the criterion for maturity, when really it is 
only one consideration which could be internalized, and as we have now seen, one for which 
there is not good evidence in the cognitive and social sciences. Even if unification were to 
eventually be internalized by all the sciences, there is no reason to privilege it as a criterion of 
maturity. 
A criticism that might be raised against my view is that philosophy is external, so as a 
philosopher I am trying to impose a pluralist agenda on the cognitive and social sciences 
from outside. However, to worry about this is to misunderstand my conclusion. I am not 
arguing on philosophical grounds that the cognitive and social sciences should be pluralist. 
My discussion of pluralism was designed only to prompt the intuition that pluralism is a live 
possibility; if pluralism is to be internalized, it will have to result in a track record of success 
in the relevant sciences over time. It may be that unification will prove itself in the cognitive 
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and social sciences and come to be internalized, and perhaps the successes of the method so 
far are the beginnings of this process. However they are insufficient at this stage, and the case 
for them does not look promising. 
We can now see that this account of immaturity meets the desiderata set out above. 
Not only does it give us a sense of what physics is doing better than psychology, it also 
suggests what cognitive and social scientists should do next (stop imposing unification as a 
criterion), and gives philosophers of science a useful role (in recommending trying out the 
pluralist approach and smoothing the path towards it). Returning to the example I have been 
using throughout will illustrate these points. 
 
5.1 The Cognitive Atlas Project Revisited 
Reconsideration of the Cognitive Atlas project shows us one way that pluralism might 
be tested in practice to see whether it should be internalized. Currently, disagreements over 
concepts are built in to the project with space for discussion of disagreements over 
definitions. Recall that if there is sufficient disagreement a concept may fork, i.e. be split into 
several different definitions with a disambiguation page (Poldrack et al., 2011, 7±8). This 
may be seen as a way to approach unification, as discussed in section 2 of this paper, and I 
take it that this is Poldrack eW DO¶V DLP %ut alternatively, it could be a way to capture 
pluralism. If the disagreements remain built in to the project and this is successful, the 
science has internalized a means of coping with pluralism. It could function as a database for 
tracking the other frameworks available in the discipline to aid communication and 
collaboration. This could help, for example, with translating results and conclusions between 
the language of one framework and another, or with selecting the most appropriate 
framework for embarking on a new research project. As mentioned above (Dale, 2008; 
Mitchell, 2002, 2003; Goertzen, 2010; Smythe and McKenzie, 2010), many pluralists think 
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that interaction between the different frameworks would have to be an essential part of a 
successful pluralist science, and projects like the Cognitive Atlas could facilitate that. 
This is speculative, and only trying the idea out in practice can determine whether it 
will work. At this stage the project has not proved successful or unsuccessful, so it is too 
early to say whether permanently building disagreement into big data approaches as a means 
of coping with pluralism could be internalized; this is just one possibility. It is not yet clear 
where the internal/external distinction should fall. 
 
6. Conclusion 
According to the received view, the cognitive and social sciences are immature 
because they are disunified, in the sense of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in 
play. I have used the Cognitive Atlas project as a way to illustrate this disunity, and 
VFLHQWLVWV¶DWWHPSWVWRPRYHEH\RQGLWDQGDFKLHYHPDWXULW\ 
However, there are reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be 
disunified, and if this is correct, immaturity cannot be disunity. I have therefore given a new 
DFFRXQW RI ZKDW LW LV WR EH DQ LPPDWXUH VFLHQFH EDVHG RQ 6KDSHUH¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
internal and external considerations. According to this account, an immature science is one 
which is at an early stage in the process of internalizing factors to rely on to shape its theories 
and practices, and which therefore does not yet have a clearly delineated internal/external 
distinction. The cognitive and social sciences are less mature than the physical sciences in 
this sense,Q6KDSHUH¶VZRUGVWKH\KDYe not yet µlearned how WROHDUQ¶ (Shapere, 1986a, 7). 
Applying the new account, we have seen that unification is one criterion which has 
not proved itself successful enough to be internalized into the cognitive and social sciences. 
Where unification with a neighbouring domain is applied as a criterion in these disciplines, it 
is as an external consideration, based on its success in the physical sciences. The inability of 
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the cognitive and social sciences to live up to this criterion explains the prevalence of the 
received view of immaturity. Ceasing to rely on this external consideration by being open to 
the possibility of pluralism may accelerate the process of maturation for the cognitive and 
social sciences.  
I returned to the Cognitive Atlas project as an illustration of one way that pluralism 
might be tried out and internalized if it is successful. Acceptance of disunity and plurality 
may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity. 
One role for philosophers is in clarifying the status projects like the Cognitive Atlas 
project could have²the scientists involved do not talk in terms of immature science or 
internalization, and it could benefit them to do so. Relatedly, philosophers could make 
recommendations about scientific education and institutional organization to facilitate 
pluralist practice. (The suggestions in Robert Sternberg and Elena Grigorenko¶V [2001] 
provide a useful starting point). 
A further implication of this work for philosophers of science is a recommendation to 
ORRNPRUHFORVHO\ DW6KDSHUH¶Vdistinction between internal and external criteria. It has not 
received much attention, perhaps due to the fall from grace of cruder versions of the 
internal/external distinction. This paper has suggested a modification RI6KDSHUH¶VGLVWLQFWLRn 
so that it is applied at different levels of organization; internalization by one discipline is not 
internalization by science as a whole. As a further complication, the boundaries between 
disciplines are not static. As Shapere sa\V µWKe claim that a certain body of alleged 
information constitutes a domain is a hypothesis, subject to rejection in the light of new 
discoveries¶6KDSHUH642). The possibility of changes to domains adds a further layer 
of complication to the picture that has not been considered here. Further work on this will 
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1
 .XKQ¶VSRVLWLRQPD\QRWEH this simple (see Von Eckhardt, 1993, 353±354) but this is how 
his view is usually construed in discussions of immaturity. 
 
2
 1RWH WKDW WKLV LV QRW ³IUDPHZRUN´ LQ WKH VHQVH PHDQW E\ WKRVH GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ IUDPHZRUN
from content (in the tradition of Carnap, 1950). In my sense of the term, frameworks include 
some aspects of theoretical content as well as more structural aspects.  
 
3
 This notion of reasons is a little restrictive. Shapere does say that ideas, methods etc. which 
have not yet been fully accepted as background information, but were constructed based on 
such background, and function in the same ways, can be FDOOHG ³UHDVRQV´ in a derivative 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
4
 While I would describe this position as a species of realism, if its claims are too minimal to 
constitute realism in the eyes of some readers, they may refer to the position as anti-realist or 
relativist. It is certainly not compatible with certain forms of realism. The important thing is 
to be clear about the position itself, not whether it is tagged with a label that has currently 
fallen out of favour. 
 
5
 I take it that this notion of success can also rule out pseudosciences because they do not 
respond properly to failures to establish a track record of success. It is not the case that 
anything can be allowed to be a criterion for success, only that multiple different things can 
count as such. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
 
6
 It might be significant that some very modern physical science shows increasing 
specialisation and disunity. This could suggest that the run of success had by unification in 
physics and chemistry is coming to an end. If this is right, and the change is rational, it is 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK6KDSHUH¶VYLHZWKDWHYHQWKHPRVWHQWUHQFKHGSDUWVRIDVFLHQFHFDQEH
overturned. If those who advocate pluralism across the board are correct, it may be that 
unification should become an external consideration in the modern physical sciences too. I 
take no view on this here, as doing so would involve detailed examination of cases in the 
physical sciences. With thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pressing this point. 
 
